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During the last four decades, economists have made considerable progress in understanding
the theoretical structure of strategic behaviour under market mechanisms, such as auctions,
when a small number of potential participants exists; see Krishna (2002) for a comprehensive
presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device commonly used to describe bidder motivation at auctions is a
continuous random variable which represents individual-speci¯c heterogeneity in valuations.
The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder's receiving an independent draw
from a distribution of valuations. Conditional on this random variable, the bidder is assumed
to act purposefully, maximizing either the expected pro¯t or the expected utility of pro¯t
from winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that the bidders are ex
ante symmetric, their independent draws coming from the same distribution of valuations,
an assumption that then allows the researcher to focus on a representative agent's decision
rule when describing equilibrium behaviour. However, at many real-world auctions and in
many economic environments, the valuations across bidders are often better represented by
draws from di®erent distributions; i.e., asymmetries are important.
Investigating equilibrium behaviour in the presence of asymmetries has challenged
researchers for some time. Only under the most commonly-used informational assumptions,
the independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) described above, has much progress been
made. In particular, under some auction mechanisms, such as the oral, descending-price
(also known as Dutch) auction, asymmetries can induce ine±cient allocations, while under
other mechanisms, such as the oral, ascending-price (also known as English) auction,
e±cient allocations obtain. Moreover, when asymmetries are present, the well-known
Revenue Equivalence Proposition (REP) no longer holds. Of course, admitting multiple
units of the same good complicates matters considerably as the research of Weber (1983),
for example, has shown.
1Most structural econometric research devoted to investigating equilibrium behaviour
at auctions has involved single-unit auctions within the symmetric IPVP. Examples include
Paarsch (1992,1997); Donald and Paarsch (1993,1996,2002); La®ont, Ossard, and Vuong
(1995); Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000); Haile and Tamer (2003); and Li (2003). Of
the few empirical papers in which multi-unit auctions have been considered Donald, Paarsch,
and Robert (1996) and Brendstrup (2002) have investigated sequential, English auctions
within the symmetric IPVP, while Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) have investigated the
e®ects of capacity-constraint heterogeneity at sequential, low-price, sealed-bid procurement
auctions with symmetric, independent private costs and Horta» csu (2002) has investigated
share auctions within the symmetric IPVP. Bajari (1997) dealt explicitly with asymmetric
auctions, investigating low-price, sealed-bid, single-unit procurement auctions with inde-
pendent asymmetric cost draws. Unlike the other papers, however, his is within a Bayesian
framework.
Building on the research of Brendstrup (2002), we develop an empirical private-values
framework within which asymmetries in valuations at multi-unit, sequential, English auc-
tions can be investigated. Speci¯cally, we propose a nonparametric structural-econometric
strategy to identify and to estimate the distributions of latent valuations for di®erent classes
of bidders. We then implement this framework using daily data from a ¯sh auction in Grenº a,
Denmark and, in the case of single-unit supply, we estimate how much additional revenue
the administrators of the Grenaa Fiskeauktion could expect to gain were they to switch to
an alternative and commonly-used selling mechanism, the Dutch auction; we also investigate
the economic extent of the ine±ciencies induced when this alternative selling mechanism is
employed.
Our paper is in three more parts. In the next section, we outline a notation and then
develop the intuition behind our approach, demonstrating its feasibility by ¯rst examining
single-unit English auctions. In particular, we develop a simple theoretical model of bidder
2behaviour at single-unit English auctions within the IPVP and then derive the data-
generating process of the winning bid at such auctions when a bidder's valuation is an
independent draw from one of several di®erent classes of distributions; i.e., in the presence
of asymmetries. We then provide a constructive proof of Theorem 2 in Athey and Haile
(2002) to demonstrate that the distributions of the di®erent classes of latent valuations
are nonparametrically identi¯ed when the identity of the winner is observed. We propose
a semi-nonparametric estimation strategy based on methods of approximation using a
particular family of orthogonal polynomials, Laguerre polynomials. We then show that
our strategy admits observed, auction-speci¯c covariates in a computationally parsimonious
way. An appropriately modi¯ed semi-nonparametric estimator, based on another class of
orthogonal polynomials, Hermite polynomials, proves quite attractive in practice. We apply
our estimator to data from a sample of single-unit ¯sh auctions held in Grenº a, which was
often spelt \Grenaa" in old Danish, and then use our estimates to undertake an exercise
in comparative institutional design, evaluating the performance of the Dutch auction vis-
µ a-vis the English auction. Having demonstrated the intuition as well as the feasibility of
our approach, we then analyze in section 3 multi-unit auctions assuming that the numbers
of units won by each bidder at earlier stages of the auctions are observed as well. We
summarize and conclude in the ¯nal section of the paper. In an appendix, we document
the creation of the data set used.
2. Single-Unit Auctions
We begin our analysis of multi-unit, sequential, English auctions by examining single-unit
English auctions. We use this section to develop a notation, to introduce known results,
and to demonstrate how our methods work within a well-understood environment. In
the following section, we extend the framework in a natural way to sequential, multi-unit
auctions.
32.1. Theoretical Model
We consider an English auction of a single object assuming that each of the n(¸ 2) potential
bidders is from one of J di®erent classes where J is less than or equal to n. A potential
bidder of class j draws his valuation independently from the cumulative distribution function
Fj(v) having corresponding probability density function fj(v). We assume that the Fjs have
common support on the interval [0;1).
We model the English auction using the Milgrom and Weber (1982) clock model.
Speci¯cally, the clock is set initially at some minimum (reserve) price and then proceeds
to rise continuously. As the price rises, bidders signal their exit from the auction. For our
purposes, it is unnecessary to be speci¯c concerning this signalling. Su±ce it to say that
when all but one of the bidders have dropped out, the remaining bidder is the winner and
the price he pays is the last bid his last opponent was willing to pay.
At English auctions within the IPVP, it is a dominant strategy for nonwinners to bid
up to their true valuation. Hence, the winner will be the bidder with the highest valuation
and the winning bid will be the second-highest valuation. From Balakrishnan and Rao
(1998), we know that the probability density function of the second-highest order statistic
















[1 ¡ Ftype(1)(y)] ¢¢¢ [1 ¡ Ftype(n)(y)]
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where the vector F collects the cumulative distribution functions of the J parent classes.
The above matrix on the right is (n £ n) where each column represents a bidder. The
¯rst (n ¡ 2) rows list the cumulative distribution functions, while the last row lists the
survivor functions, the [1 ¡ Ftype(i)(y)]s, and the second-to-last row has the probability
4density functions of the Ftype(i)(y)s. Here, type(¢) is a function which returns a bidder's
class; e.g., if bidder i is of class j, then type(i) returns j, so Ftype(i)(y) equals Fj(y).
The symbol \Perm" outside the matrix above denotes the permanent operator. The
permanent is similar to the determinant except all the principal minors have positive sign.








A = a(ei + fh) + b(di + fg) + c(dh + eg):
Unlike the determinant, which in the transformation of random variables ensures that a
probability density function integrates to one, the permanent is a counting device, like the
permutation formula. It is especially useful when ¯nding combinations from di®erent types
of distributions.
To see that equation (2.1) collapses to the probability density function of the second-
highest order statistic when the Fjs are identical, recall that the probability density function
of the second-highest order statistic from n independently and identically distributed draws
from F(y) is
g(2:n)(y) = n(n ¡ 1)F(y)n¡2[1 ¡ F(y)]f(y):
With some loss of generality, consider the following illustrative example where n and J are






[1 ¡ F1(y)] [1 ¡ F2(y)] [1 ¡ F3(y)]
1
A
= F1(y)[1 ¡ F3(y)]f2(y) + F1(y)[1 ¡ F2(y)]f3(y)+
F2(y)[1 ¡ F3(y)]f1(y) + F2(y)[1 ¡ F1(y)]f3(y)+
F3(y)[1 ¡ F2(y)]f1(y) + F3(y)[1 ¡ F1(y)]f2(y):
5which one can show by direct substitution is
g(2:3)(y) = 6F(y)[1 ¡ F(y)]f(y)
when Fj(y) equals F(y) for j = 1;2;3. The purpose of introducing equation (2.1) and the
above example is to illustrate that g(2:3)(y), the probability density function of the winning
bid at the auction, will be a mixture of the J probability density functions ffj(y)gJ
j=1,
where the mixing weights vary with y. The model is nonparametrically unidenti¯ed when
only data on the number of potential bidders n and the winning bid Y are observed.
2.2. Nonparametric Identi¯cation
The data available to a researcher determine identi¯cation. Our case is no di®erent.
Typically, at English auctions, the winning bid for each unit sold is readily available. Often,
too, one can obtain transaction information (e.g., receipts of sale or tax records) from
the seller concerning who won the goods sold as well as the number of potential bidders
(e.g., a list of customers). In addition to these data, we assume that the researcher can
classify each of the bidders present; this may just mean that the researcher assumes each
bidder is di®erent from each of his opponents. Given this information and under suitable
regularity conditions, we can identify and estimate the parent cumulative distribution
functions fFjgJ
j=1.
By assumption, we know the identity of the winning bidder, so our model falls under
Theorem 2 of Athey and Haile (2002) who cite Meilijson (1981) and Prakasa Rao (1992) to
claim that all of the Fjs are nonparametrically identi¯ed. We provide a constructive proof
of this theorem here because we believe it will help the reader to understand our proof in
the multi-unit case, which is presented in section 3. To begin, we introduce some additional
notation. Let G0
(2:n)(y;i) denote the true population cumulative distribution function of the
winning bid at an auction won by bidder i and let F 0
type(i)(y) denote the true population
cumulative distribution function for class type(i). Now, bidder i wins at price y when his
6valuation exceeds those of his opponents and all of the valuations of his opponents are less
than or equal to y, so
G0
(2:n)(y;i) = Pr[(Vi ¸ Vj) and (Vj · y j 6= i)]













Di®erentiating with respect to y both sides of (2.2) for each i yields:
dG0


































































































7which establishes the link to equation (2.1). From
dG0




















Hence, we have a system of so-called Pfa±an integral equations. Taking the natural
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type and dG0 are (n £ 1) column vectors whose ith rows equal F0
type(i)(y) and
dG0
(2:n)(y;i), respectively. From Meilijson (1981), we know that this system of Pfa±an

















has a unique solution, which leads to
Theorem 1: The distributions of the valuations are identi¯ed from the winning bids
and the identities of the winners.
Clearly, when J is less than n, testable overidentifying restrictions exist.
82.3. Semi-Nonparametric Estimator
The arduous, and sometimes delicate, computations involved in approximating the solu-
tion to a system of functional equations as described above made us consider the semi-
nonparametric (SNP) approach developed by Gallant and Nychka (1987) when estimating
the Fjs. In the SNP approach, we work o® the probability density function of the winning
bid implicit in (2.2). The idea is to approximate °exibly an unknown probability density
function by a Laguerre polynomial; see Judd (1998). Initially, we have chosen the Laguerre
polynomial because its domain is [0;1), which corresponds to our notion that the marginal
utility of a good should be non-negative. Also, our parameterization of the Laguerre poly-
nomial guarantees that the probability density function is non-negative. Later, when we
admit covariates, we shall use Hermite polynomials. The reasons for the switch will be
obvious then.
2.3.1. Technical Assumptions
In order to apply the SNP framework, we assume that the probability density function
fj lives in the space Fj which consists of densities having several properties. To describe
these properties, we introduce some additional notation. First, let d denote the number of
derivatives for the unknown but true probability density function f0
j on [0;1). Now, for
some integer d0(> 1
2), for some bound D0, for some "0(> 0), and for ±0(> 1
2) the space Fj
consists of the probability density functions having the following form:
fj(y) = [hj(y)]2 + "exp(¡y)
with jjhjjjd+d0;2;¹ being less than D0 and " being greater than "0 where ¹ equals (1 + y2)±0








9where D® is the di®erential operator. The bound D0 imposes a restriction on the densities
in Fj by restricting the tails of these densities from above. This restriction is needed to
ensure that the space Fj is compact.
The term "exp(¡y) is a lower bound on the density used to avoid logfj(y) going to
¡1 and
R
logfj(y)fj0(y) dy going to ¡1 for any two elements fj and fj0 in Fj: In practice,
the restriction is relatively unimportant as " can be arbitrarily small.
2.3.2. Heuristic Description
To make the discussion described above concrete, consider the following: It is well known







where Lk(y) is the Laguerre polynomial of order k. We seek to approximate the in¯nite-









Of course, when truncating an in¯nite-order polynomial to obtain a ¯nite-order one, we
introduce error. However, by letting the degree of the approximation get better as the
sample size increases (i.e., by letting pT increase at a rate that is slower than the rate at
which the sample size T increases), we argue, at least heuristically, that our approximation
will converge to the truth. Thus, for our approach to be strictly nonparametric, we need to
allow the degree of the polynomial to tend to in¯nity as the sample size increases to in¯nity.
2.3.3. Mechanics of Implementation
A natural way to implement this ¯nite-order approximation is the method of quasi-
maximum likelihood. To wit, our estimator f ^ fjTgJ






















®j = (®j0;:::;®jpT) :
Z 1
0
fjT(yj®j) dy = 1
¾
and fpTg is a nondecreasing sequence of integers. It will often be possible to set " to be
zero without the logarithm of the likelihood function becoming ill-behaved.
2.3.4. Admitting Covariates
Having outlined the SNP framework, we can now illustrate how observed covariates are
easily introduced without much additional computation. Imagine that at the tth auction
the sth draw of bidder i who is of class j can be written as
logV
ij
st = xt¯j + U
ij
st
where Fj(u) is the cumulative distribution function of U
ij
st and xt¯j represents how the
location of the jth class is shifted as a result of the observed (K £1) covariate vector xt at
auction t and the conformable unknown vector ¯j for each class j = 1;:::;J. When U
ij
st is
independent of the xt, incorporating the covariate vector x into this quasi-maximum likeli-
hood framework simply involves optimizing with respect to (J £K) additional parameters.
We have chosen the logarithmic tranformation of V to guarantee that the marginal utility,
the valuation, of the good is positive.







because the support for the distribution of the Us is potentially the entire real line. Here,
Hk(u) denotes an Hermite polynomial of order k. Of course, the support for the conditional









One might think that our approach cn only allow the distribution to vary in location










so the higher moments of V 's conditional distribution also vary with xt through xt¯j as in
a single-index model. Thus, we believe that this quite a °exible way in which to introduce
observed covariate heterogeneity.
2.3.5. Consistency
Having described the SNP estimation strategy, we demonstrate that this strategy is consis-









where ¹ equals (1 + y2)± and ± is contained in the open interval (1
2;±0). From Gallant
and Nychka (1987) as well as Fenton and Gallant (1996), we know that the technical
conditions assumed above as well as the structure of our auction model implies that our
polynomials will converge to the true underlying distributions when the degree of the
polynomial approximations increase with the sample size T. The following theorem makes
formal this claim:





jj ^ fjT ¡ f0
i jj
¶
= 0 almost surely:
12Figure 1.
Map of Denmark.
Of course, demonstrating consistency is just one part of the exercise. It remains to charac-
terize the asymptotic distribution. Characterizing the asymptotic distribution as pT goes
to in¯nity is beyond the scope of this paper. One way to characterize the asymptotic distri-
bution for a ¯xed pT is to use the standard ¯rst-order asymptotics. This procedure is well
known (see, for example, Eastwood and Gallant [1991]), so we shall not repeat it here.
2.4. An Application: The Grenaa Fiskeauktion
In this subsection, we present an empirical analysis obtained by applying the SNP estimator
to data from a particular auction, the Grenaa Fiskeauktion, which is an oral, ascending-
price auction held each weekday morning at 5:00 a.m. in Grenº a, Denmark. To locate Grenº a,
which is on the east coast of Jutland, see Figure 1; look to the northwest of Zealand to
see the point of land nearly touching the 11±E-longitude line, almost halfway between 56±N
and 57±N.
13The English-auction format is frequently used to sell ¯sh because it is fast and thus
well-suited to selling perishable products. Another commonly-used format is the oral,
descending-price auction. In fact, in Denmark the bulk of ¯sh is sold at Dutch auctions.
One goal of the empirical work presented below is to provide estimates of the primitives (i.e.,
the fjs) necessary to undertake a comparative institutional analysis later where expected
revenues under Dutch auctions are compared with those under English auctions when a
single unit of the good is supplied.
By international standards, the Grenaa Fiskeauktion is very small. The sellers are the
local ¯shermen who ply the Kattegat and beyond. They have banded together to create
the auction house. The bidders are mostly resale trade ¯rms. One feature of this auction
is that there are two major bidders and several other much smaller bidders. Therefore, it
is natural to analyze the behaviour of these two classes of bidders as if their valuations are
draws from di®erent distributions.
The bidders at the Grenaa Fiskeauktion can be considered agents of retail sellers who
have placed orders at pre-speci¯ed prices. We think of these retail sellers as living in
spacially-separated markets where, because of location, some market power exists. In these
markets, the retail sellers have individual-speci¯c marginal revenue curves. We imagine
that these are the source of the variation in valuations for the bidders. In short, we believe
that the IPVP is a reasonable model of the market for ¯sh in and around Grenº a.
The ¯sh supplied at the auction are graded into four main quality categories: E, A,
B, and C in descending order where E is the best and C is the worst, un¯t for human
consumption. These grades are a function of ¯sh size and freshness. Each grade has ¯ve
subcategories, 1 to 5. Subsequently, the ¯sh are packed into thirty-¯ve kilogram units which
are then sold at oral, ascending-price auctions.
While other species are sold, often irregularly, the three main species on sale in Grenº a
are cod (Gadus morhua), Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides), and plaice
14Figure 2.
Plaice, Pleuronectes platessa.
(Pleuronectes platessa). This last species, a likeness of which is depicted in Figure 2, is
called r¿dsp½tte in Denmark and sometimes referred to as right-eyed °ounder in North
America because both of its eyes are on the right-hand side of its head.
For each species and grade of ¯sh, a reserve price exists; this is set by the Danish
government in accordance with regulations determined by the European Union. The local
auction is allowed to deviate from this reserve price by up to ten percent.
The particular product we chose to study is plaice, grade A3, because it was sold, more
or less, steadily throughout the three-year period we chose to examine: 2 January 2000 to
31 December 2002.
After consulting with the auctioneer in Grenº a and after examining the raw data, we
found that a total of seven potential bidders, two major and ¯ve minor, existed. Each of
these bidders attended virtually every auction so, despite the presence of a reserve price
which typically induces endogenous participation, we believe that issues of endogenous
participation can be safely ignored in this case.
In the archives at the Grenaa Fiskeauktion, for each auction indexed by t, information
concerning the following variables was available:
151) winning bid yt;
2) number of potential bidders nt, which is seven;
3) identity of the winner.
In total, we were able to gather data concerning 301 single-unit auctions of plaice,
grade A3. In Figure 3, we present the histogram of winning bids, while in Figure 4, we
present the empirical distribution function of the winning bids. The sample mean is 19:01
DKK per kilogram, while the sample standard deviation is 6:33. The sample minimum and
maximum are 7:00 and 37:00, respectively. The sample mean of the reserve price r was 6:75
DKK per kilogram; this reserve price never bound.
One of the implications of the symmetric IPVP is that, on average, bidders should
win the same proportion of auctions over time. To examine this implication, we calculated
the number of times each bidder won. These are listed in Table 1. Since there were 301
auctions, the expected number of times that a particular bidder would be expected to win
is (301=7) or 43 times. Now, letting Oi denote the observed number of wins and Ei denote





which is distributed Â2(6) under the null hypothesis of the symmetric IPVP. Our calculated
Â2 statistic was 241:02, which has a p-value less than 0:0001, suggesting that these data are
not from a process within the symmetric IPVP.
From Table 1, it would appear that two classes of bidders exist: major bidders, who
have identities 1 and 2, and minor bidders, who have identities 3 through 7.1 We adopted
the convention that type(i) equal 1 denotes a minor bidder, while type(i) equal 2 denotes
a major bidder. Thus, G(2:7)(y;1) denotes the distribution of the winning bid at last-unit
1 The reader might feel that there are three classes of bidders: majors | 1 and 2; middles | 3
and 5; and minors | 4, 6, and 7. We have undertaken our analysis with these three classes of
bidders as well. The results are qualitatively similar.
16Figure 3.
Histogram of Winning Bids: Single-Unit Auctions.






























Empirical Distribution Function of Winning Bids.






















































auction for minor bidders, while G(2:7)(y;2) denotes the distribution of the winning bid at
last-unit auction for major bidders.
Using the data described above and a fourth-order Laguerre polynomial for the SNP
estimator, we calculated the following:




















In this application, we could set " to zero. The parameter space was then
£jT =
½
®j = (®j0;:::;®j4) :
Z 1
0
fjT(yj®j) dy = 1
¾
:
Setting this restriction in terms of ®j4, we present in Table 2 the parameters of the
approximations to the probability density functions. In Figure 5, we present graphs of
the two estimated cumulative distribution functions. The main thing to note from these
graphs is that these estimated cumulative distribution functions are very di®erent.
2.5. Comparing Institutions
Some interesting policy experiments are possible given our empirical results. For example,
at virtually every other ¯sh auction in Denmark, Dutch auctions are employed. Maskin and
18Table 2.
Estimates of Parameters of Laguerre Polynomials.







Laguerre Polynomial Estimates of Cumulative Distribution Functions.





























































Riley (2000) have argued that in the presence of asymmetries the REP no longer holds, so
the expected revenues under Dutch auctions could be higher or lower than under English
auctions. Thus, a natural empirical question is: In the case of the Grenaa Fiskeauktion,
what would be the expected di®erence in revenues? In addition, it is well-known that in
the presence of asymmetries, English auctions will yield e±cient allocations, while Dutch
auctions can yield ine±cient ones. However, very little is known concerning the economic
extent and importance of these ine±ciencies in practice. Based on the estimates derived
19above, we can estimate the average di®erence in revenues as well as the relative incidence
and economic importance of ine±ciencies.
To begin, we solve the decision problem faced by a representative bidder of each class
at a single-unit Dutch auction when two classes of bidders exist, n1 (¯ve in our case) bidders
whose valuations are from F1(v) and n2 (two in our case) bidders whose valuations are from
F2(v), where (n1 + n2) equals n (seven in our case). Expected pro¯t E(¼j) to a bidder of
class j who has valuation v and adopts strategy sj is
E(¼j) = (v ¡ sj)Pr(winjsj) j = 1;2:
Suppose that all bidders of class j use a monotonically increasing strategy ¾j(v) for j = 1;2.
Under this assumption, one can put structure on the probability of winning an auction,


































































when ¾j is a monotonic function.
A number of di®erent strategies exists to solve systems of di®erential equations. How-
ever, because the Lipschitz conditions are not satis¯ed for the above system of di®erential
equations, it cannot be solved analytically. Following Bajari (2001), we chose to use numer-
ical methods to approximate the solution. We restricted ourselves to a compact interval of
the real line [6:75;40:00] where virtually all of the mass is. On this interval, we approxi-
mated the true unknown inverse-bid function by a fourth-order polynomial. We chose the
coe±cients of this polynomial using the method of nonlinear least squares as documented
by Bajari (2001) for his third method. In Figure 6, we present our estimates of the bid
functions for major and minor bidders. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid function for minor
bidders is everywhere above that for major bidders, except at the endpoints where they are
constrained by theory to be the same.
To estimate the winner under either Dutch or English auctions, we used simulation
methods. In particular, we generated a sample of uniform [0;1] random numbers, one for
each bidder, in each of 1;000 simulation auctions; i.e., fU1`;U2`;:::;U7`g1000
`=1 . For bidder i,
we used the estimated inverse bid function ^ F¡1
type(i)(ui`) to generate an estimated valuation
^ vi`. Using these estimated valuations (^ v1`; ^ v2`;:::; ^ v7`) in conjunction with the estimated
bid functions above, we determined the estimated winning bid at the Dutch auction ^ w`, the
identity of the winner at the Dutch auction, the winning bid at the English auction ^ y`, the
identity of the bidder with the highest valuation, and an estimate of the highest valuation
^ vmax;` = max(^ v1`; ^ v2`;:::; ^ v7`):
We then averaged over simulations to get the average winning bid under Dutch and English
auctions, ¹ w and ¹ y respectively, as well as an estimate of ine±ciency incidence and an
21Figure 6.
Estimated Bid Functions for Dutch Auctions.

































estimate of the value of this ine±ciency using (^ vmax ¡ ^ y) when a misallocation obtained.
In none of our experiments did an ine±cient allocation obtain. For English auctions, ¹ y
was 14:94 DKK with a standard deviation of 0:39, a minimum of 10:92, and a maximum
of 15:98. For Dutch auctions, ¹ w was 12:39 DKK with a standard deviation of 0:16, a
minimum of 8:92, and a maximum of 12:42. Thus, it appears that the English auction,
at which an e±cient allocation always obtains, also garners more revenue than the Dutch
auction. The administrators of the Grenº a auction appear to have made a good choice of
selling mechanism.
The reader might ask: How do Dutch and English auctions coÄ exist in Denmark? One
reason why competing auction formats may coexist has to do with a theory developed by
Peters (1997) concerning a competitive distribution of auctions. Peters hypothesizes that,
when populations are heterogeneous, di®erent formats can coexist simultaneously because
each ful¯lls the needs of a subset of the population.
223. Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section, we extend the analysis of section 2 to the case of multiple units. We begin
by distinguishing between multi-object auctions and multi-unit auctions. At multi-unit
auctions it matters not which unit a bidder wins but rather the aggregate number of units
he wins, while at multi-object auctions a bidder is concerned about which speci¯c object(s)
he wins. Ours is a multi-unit auction.
3.1. Model (continued)
We consider an auction at which m identical units are to be sold sequentially. Below, we
refer to the sale of a speci¯c unit as a stage of the auction. We assume that all n(¸ 2)
potential bidders have weakly positive marginal utility for all units of the good for sale so
that, in the absence of a reserve price, each potential bidder demands each of the m units.
Again, a potential bidder can be one of J di®erent classes where a potential bidder of class
j draws his m independent valuations from the cumulative distribution function Fj(v).
Again, we use a clock to describe the price at a multi-unit, sequential, oral, ascending-
price auction. Speci¯cally, in the ¯rst stage, the clock is set initially at the reserve price
and then rises continuously, with bidders signalling their exit from this stage of the auction.
When all but one of the bidders have dropped out, the remaining bidder is the winner and
the price he pays is the last bid his last opponent was willing to pay. After the ¯rst stage
of the auction, the price is reset to its reserve and the second unit is sold using the same
clock mechanism. The auctioneer proceeds until all m units have been sold.
To derive the probability density function of the winning bid for the last unit sold
we propose the following strategy: Rather than solving for the equilibrium of the entire
m-stage sequential game of incomplete information (as Donald, Paarsch, and Robert [1996]
do) here, following Brendstrup (2002), we are content to focus on only the last stage of
the game. We use the fact that, within the IPVP, it is a dominant strategy for each
23bidder (except the winner, of course), to bid his highest remaining valuation for the last
unit on sale. At this stage of the auction, this strategy is unique, unlike the equilibrium
bidding strategy for the entire auction which may not be. Moreover, this last-unit strategy
is less informationally demanding than some others identi¯cation strategies proposed in
the literature; e.g., Donald, Paarsch, and Robert (1996) assume that bidders observe the
drop-out prices of their opponents (also known as open exit), but our empirical work carries
through when bidders do not observe the drop-out prices of nonwinners other than the last
active opponent of the winner (also known as closed exit).
Previous authors, such as Austin and Katzman (2002), have noted this last-unit result,
but none of these authors has derived the exact distribution of the winning bid in the last
stage of the auction. What complicates matters is that, even if the potential bidders enter
the auction symmetrically, by stage m of the auction, the distributions of remaining valua-
tions will be asymmetric. Of course, when the potential bidders start out asymmetrically,
these asymmetries are potentially magni¯ed or diminished, depending on how the sequential
auction has proceeded. Empirically, one needs a strategy to disentangle these e®ects. That
is our contribution.
To simplify notation, we begin with the ranked valuations of a potential bidder, from
highest to lowest. Thus, for potential bidder i who is of class j, we denote the highest
valuation by vi
1 and the lowest by vi
m. We imagine that vi
1 represents potential bidder
i's marginal utility for the ¯rst unit won, vi
2 the marginal utility of the next unit won,
and so forth. It is important to note that once a bidder's valuations are ranked they
become order statistics of the parent distribution Fj and are neither independently nor
identically distributed. In fact, from Balakrishnan and Rao (1998), we know that the






(m ¡ `)!(` ¡ 1)!
Z Fj(v`)
0
um¡`(1 ¡ u)`¡1 du:
24The above can be interpreted as the cumulative distribution function of the marginal utility
of a class j bidder for the `th unit of the good when m are available.
We assume that a bidder will want to ful¯ll his most valuable opportunities ¯rst.
Hence, the ¯rst unit he wins will correspond to the highest realization, the second to the
second-highest realization, and so forth. Since each bidder values all units, a nonwinner
of any stage realizes that he cannot win all units. Therefore, the lowest realizations of his
valuations become irrelevant.
Determining the joint distribution of equilibrium winning bids at all stages of the
auction game is computationally di±cult, some might say impossible. But, within the IPVP,
in the last stage of the auction, it is possible to use the standard dominance argument of
English auctions to argue that the winning bid will be the second highest of the remaining
valuations for this ¯nal unit.
As outlined in section 2, we know that the probability density function of the second-
highest order statistic for n independent draws, each from a di®erent type of distribution,
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[1 ¡ Ftype(1)(yjw1;m)] ¢¢¢ [1 ¡ Ftype(n)(yjwn;m)]
1
C C C C
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:
In this case, the generic element of the above matrix Ftype(i)(yjwi;m) depends not just on
the parent class distribution from which bidder i's valuations were initially drawn Fj(y),
but also on total supply m as well as how many units that bidder has won in the earlier
stages of the auction wi.
To illustrate, suppose that bidder i is of class j and has won wi units in the earlier stages
of an auction for which m units were for sale, then the cumulative distribution function of
25his highest remaining valuation will be
Ftype(i)(yjwi;m) =
m!
(m ¡ wi ¡ 1)!wi!
Z Fj(y)
0
um¡wi¡1(1 ¡ u)wi du: (3.1)
Of course, recovering the probability density function simply involves di®erentiating the
above cumulative distribution function to get
ftype(i)(yjwi;m) =
m!
(m ¡ wi ¡ 1)!wi!
Fj(y)m¡wi¡1[1 ¡ Fj(y)]wifj(y):
In the de¯nition of g(2:n) above, w denotes an (n£1) vector summarizing the number of
units won in the earlier stages of the auction by each bidder where
Pn
i=1 wi equals (m¡1).
We assume that w is observed by the researcher.
3.2. Identi¯cation (continued)
In this section, we argue that the logic used to demonstrate nonparametric identi¯cation
in subsection 2.2 can be applied to the last unit sold at the multi-unit auction. However,
one must be careful when comparing last-unit auctions as they will typically di®er in the
number of units won in earlier stages of the auctions by di®erent classes of bidders. We
refer to the vector w that tabulates the number of units won by each bidder in the (m¡1)
earlier stages of the auction as the state of the auction.2 Note that when n is three and m
is two, the states are
(1 0 0); (0 1 0); and (0 0 1);
while when n is three and m is three, the states are
(1 1 0); (0 1 1); (1 0 1);(2 0 0); (0 2 0); and (0 0 2):
Obviously, the curse of dimensionality could plague an empirical worker as the total number
of states can be potentially quite large relative to the total number of observations in a
2 It is unnecessary to include m in the state vector as (1 +
Pn
i=1 wi) equals m. To wit, w is
su±cient for m.
26sample. Be that as it may, identi¯cation is done in terms of population quantities, and
in the population all combinations of the ws will be observed. Thus, we demonstrate
identi¯cation for one w.
To begin, we augment our previous notation. Let G0
(2:n)(y;ijw) denote the true pop-
ulation cumulative distribution function of the winning bid in the last stage of an auction
won by bidder i when the state vector is w. Now
G0




















































(2:n)(u;ijw) i = 1;:::;n:
Collecting the F0
type(i)(yjwi;m)s in F 0
type(yjw) and the G0
(2:n)(y;ijw)s in G0(yjw) and using

















for which we know a unique solution exists. Now, from (3.1), we know that F 0
type(i)(yjwi;m)
has a strictly monotonic relationship with F 0
j (y), so we can write





27where Á(¢) is strictly monotonic in each element of its argument vector. Thus, there exists
a one-to-one mapping, so nonparametric identi¯cation has been demonstrated.
3.3. Semi-Nonparametric Estimator (continued)
The SNP approach is numerically tractable in the presence of both states wts and covariates
xts. Thus, given f(wt;xt;yt)gT
t=1, our estimator f ^ fjTgJ























°j = (°j0;:::;°jpT) :
Z 1
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fjT(ujx¯j;°j) du = 1
¾
and fpTg is a non-decreasing sequence of integers, as before.
3.4. Application (continued)
In this subsection, we apply our methods to data from the multi-unit, sequential English
auctions held in Grenº a between 2 January 2000 and 31 December 2003. During this period,
376 multi-unit auctions were held. At these auctions, between two and four units were solds.
The average number of units for sale was 2.46, while the standard deviation was 1.49. A
major bidder won an average of 0:80 units, while a minor bidder only won an average of
0:17 units.
In Figure 7, we present box-plot graphs of the winning bids for the last unit sold,
controlling for the number of units sold. The average winning bid for the last unit does
28appears to go down as the number of units sold increases, a fact consistent with the economic
reality that equilibrium prices will vary when demand and supply curves shift. In particular,
when supply increases, but demand is constant, the price should fall.
In Figure 8, we present graphs of the average winning bid in each stage of an auction,
separately for auctions having di®erent numbers of units for sale. Thus, if bst(mt = m)
denotes the winning bid at stage s of auction t which has a total of m units for sale, then
each point graphed represents the conditional sample mean




t=1 1(mt = m)
where 1(A) again denotes the indicator function of the event A. This ¯gure illustrates a
declining-price anomaly ¯rst noted in the economics literature by Ashenfelter (1989).
We implemented the SNP estimator admitting covariates using a fourth-order Hermite
polynomial for the probability density functions. Thus, we calculated the following:


















u = (logy ¡ x¯j); ¯j 2 RK; °j 2 ­jT
¾
:
The covariates we introduced into the empirical analysis included day-of-week as well as
month-of-year dummy variables. For each class of bidders, this implied seventeen additional
covariates, so a total of thirty-four additional parameters.
In Table 3, we present the parameters of the approximations to the probability density
functions, while in Table 4 we present the estimated ¯js. In Figure 9, we present graphs of
the two estimated cumulative distribution functions, evaluated at the mean covariates ¹ x.
The covariates appear to make a considerable di®erence when evaluating the demand for
plaice, grade A3, at the Grenaa Fiskeauktion.
29Figure 7.
Box Plots of Last-Unit Winning Bids versus Number of Units for Sale.
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Figure 8.
Average Winning Bids by Stage and Number of Units for Sale.

































Estimates of Parameters of Hermite Polynomials.



























In this paper, we developed an empirical framework within which to investigate bidder
asymmetries at multi-unit, sequential, oral, ascending-price auctions within the IPVP. We
demonstrated nonparametric identi¯cation of the parent distributions of latent valuations
and then proposed a semi-nonparametric estimator of these distributions, which is nu-
31Figure 9.
SNP Estimated Cumulative Distribution Functions.
Evaluated at the Mean of the Covariates.





























































merically tractable in the presence of observed covariate heterogeneity. Subsequently, we
implemented this SNP estimator using data from single- and multi-unit, sequential, oral,
ascending-price ¯sh auctions of plaice in Grenº a, Denmark. For single-unit supply, we used
our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction
employed instead; using our estimates we found that the English auction garnered the seller
higher expected revenues than the Dutch auction.
32A. Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the creation of the data set used.
A.1. Auctions Data
Our data set was derived from information contained in the archives at the Grenaa Fiskeauk-
tion. The administrators of the auction graciously gave us access to ¯les from 2 January 2000
to 31 December 2002. This period was chosen because it is recent, so we hope that our
empirical work will be relevant. Also, during this period, data at the Grenaa Fiskeauktion
were recorded in real time on a laptop computer, so an electronic record of each transaction
was available. These records were given to us on magnetic media. From them we selected
a particular species of ¯sh, plaice, and then a speci¯c grade, A3. The choice of this species
and grade was made exclusively because it was sold frequently; we wanted a large sample
of a commonly-consumed product. Of the 718 potential auction days during our sample
period, plaice, grade A3, was sold on 677 days. Other grades of plaice may have been sold
on the remaining days, but we ignored these auctions as, in our minds, they constituted
sales of another product. Plaice, grade A3, is the highest grade of plaice available at the
Grenaa Fiskeauktion. Moreover, it is a species of ¯sh that Danes consume regularly. Having
received the electronic ¯les on which data were recorded, we selectively retrieved informa-
tion relevant to our empirical work. We then organized these into ASCII ¯les which were
the inputs to the analysis described in the text of the paper.
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